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Whether or not such courts have the power to issue other
common law writs or the statutory writ of quo warranto,
under Section 10-251 will probably depend on what a liberal
construction of such a Section as 15-766, relative to the Rich-
land County Court, would bring forth. That Section, like
similar Sections pertaining to some of the other county courts,
reads in part as follows:
All general laws and statutory provisions applicable
generally to the circuit courts of this State and trial of
cases therein shall apply to said county court and to the
conduct and trial of cases therein when not inconsistent
with this article....
Why the Treatment of Writs Herein: Attention is called
to the fact that some of the writs treated herein do not strictly
fall within "appellate procedure," but since they have to do
with "procedure" and since some of them are used either di-
rectly or indirectly by way of review, the writer thought
it best to include all of them in this handbook. In doing so
he has followed several of the outstanding authors of the
latest textbooks and casebooks on Trial and Appellate Prac-
tice, one of them being Professor Edson R. Sunderland of
the University of Michigan.
PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS FOR REVIEW
Aggrieved Party May Appeal: Section 7-2 provides that
"any party aggrieved may appeal." When is one a party who
has been aggrieved, however, sometimes is difficult to ascer-
tain and annotated cases under above section are few; so,
when new situations arise, those handling cases in South
Carolina are forced to seek a solution from decisions in other
jurisdictions, where the word "aggrieved" has been defined.
As said in White Brass Castings Co. v. Union Metal Co.
(1908), (Ill.) 83 N. E. 540:
No person is entitled to sue out a writ of error who is
not a party or privy to the record, or who is not shown
by the record to be prejudiced by the judgment. ...
The prejudice which will authorize the suing out of a
writ of error must be such that the person suing out
the writ takes or loses something directly by the judgment
or decree.
The same rule applies to review by appeal, and also to the
writs heretofore discussed.
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The Court further stated that indirect interest due to the
increasing or diminishing of stock of a corporation by a
judgment against the corporation doesn't give any or all of
the stockholders the right of review; just like a creditor of a
person against whom a judgment has been obtained has no
right of appeal.
Also, in the Colorado case of Wilson v. Board of Regents
(1909), (Colo.) 102 Pac. 1088, one is told that "aggrieved"
refers to a "substantial grievance; the denial to the party of
some claim of right, either of property or of person, or the
imposition upon him of some burden or obligation."
Can One Appeal From a Favorable Decision? The answer
appears to be, No, in this State. As said in Wilson v. So. RV.
(1922), 123 S. C. 399, 115 S. E. 764, at page 406:
The remaining exceptions are directed to the assign-
ment of alleged errors in the admission of testimony and
in the Judge's charge to the jury. The appellant's posi-
tion in this Court, in that the objective of her appeal is
to set aside a verdict in her own favor, is a somewhat
anomalous one. By the terms of our Statute law (Sec-
tion 376, Code Civ. Proc. 1912), the right of appeal is
accorded only to a "party aggrieved."
Although there are exceptional cases, the general rule
is that a plaintiff or defendant cannot appeal or prose-
cute a writ of error from or to a judgment, order, or
decree in his own favor, since he is not aggrieved there-
by," etc., 3 C. J., p. 635, §495.
See Brook v. Kirkpatrick, 72 S. C., 491; 52 S. E., 592.
If it be conceded that an exceptional case is presented
where a finding or verdict is favorable in form to a party,
but does not give him all he is entitled to, or is otherwise
prejudicial to his legal rights, the aggrieved party should
present that question to the trial Court in the first in-
stance, and the appeal should be taken from the refusal
to set aside or correct the verdict. See Gunter v. Fallow,
78 S. C., 457; 59 S. E., 79 ....
Appeal in Criminal Cases: The defendant may appeal; the
state may not. The main reason for the latter rule is that
the defendant will be twice put in jeopardy. South Carolina
joins the great majority in giving that as the reason. Some
use broader grounds as where there has been only a decision
[Vol. ii
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of an issue of law, as on a demurrer to an indictment, motion
to quash or special verdict.
South Carolina allows an appeal by the State to settle
some question of law, or from quashing an indictment. State
v. Rogers (1941), 198 S. C. 273, 17 S. E. 2d 563, gives the
rule as follows:
But, as was held in the case of State v. Ivey, 73 S. C.,
282, 53 S. E., 428, 430, wherein the State was appellant -
"The state has no right to appeal" from a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case. The State may take an ap-
peal from an order quashing an indictment, State v.
Young, 30 S. C. 399, 9 S. E. 355; State v. Bouknight,
55 S. C. 353, 33 S. E., 451, 74 Am. St. Rep., 751; or from
a judgment which substantially amounts to a quashing
of an indictment. State v. Long, 66 S. C., 398, 44 S. E.
960.
That the State has no right of appeal from judgment
upon verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, seems to have
been recognized and accepted as the law in this jurisdic-
tion from the beginning of our judicial history. State v.
Wright, 3 Brev., 421, 2 Tread. Const., 517; State v.
Bowen, 4 McCord Law, 254; State v. Edwards, 2 Nott
& McC., 13, 10 Am. Dec., 557; State v. Gathers, 15 S. C.,
370; State v. Ivey, 73 S. C., 282, 53 S. E., 428; State v.
Lynn, 120 S. C. 258, 113 S. E., 74; State v. Ludlam, 189
S. C. 69, 200 S. E., 361.
The principle is well stated in 24 C. J. S., Criminal
Law § 1663, page 262: "In those jurisdictions where the
common-law rule permitting a former acquittal to be
pleaded as an absolute bar to a subsequent prosecution
prevails, and in those jurisdictions where the consti-
tution provides that no one shall be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense, it is well settled that no writ of
error, appeal, or other proceeding lies on behalf of the
state to review or to set aside a verdict or a judgment
of acquittal in a criminal case, although there may have
been error committed by the Court, or a perverse find-
ing by the jury * * *."
No appeal is allowed where there is an acquittal or final
determination of the criminal charge. However, in State v.
Ludlow (1938), 189 S. C. 69, 200 S. E. 361, one is told by way
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